Insurer's Right to Contractual Subrogation Trumps Equitable Made-Whole Doctrine Yet Again in Texas

In Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642 (Tex.2007), the Texas Supreme Court held that the “made whole” doctrine does not apply where the parties’ agreed contract provides a clear and specific right of subrogation. Despite this ruling, the Austin Court of Appeals was recently confronted with a situation where a trial court attempted to allocate the entirety of an $800,000.00 settlement in a negligence suit to the family of an individual who was injured in an oilfield explosion and spent 52 days in the hospital before eventually succumbing to his extensive injuries. Although the insurer had intervened in the underlying lawsuit and asserted a contract-based lien of over $330,000.00 on any recovery obtained by the family, the Austin Court of Appeals ultimately agreed with the trial court that equitable principles applied to the subrogation claim, and that where “a subrogation claim works an injustice, it shall not be allowed.” Citing the insurer’s solid financial position and the financial hardship that the family would suffer should the insurer’s subrogation rights be enforced, the entire settlement was ultimately allocated to the family under the “made whole” doctrine.

In reversing the Austin Court of Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court held in Texas Health Ins. Risk Pool v. Sigmundik, 315 S.W.3d 12, 14 (Tex.2010) that the “made whole” doctrine was inapplicable, and that it was improper to cut the insurer out of a settlement to which it had a valid claim. Moreover, the Court noted that the trial court could not cut the insurer out of the settlement simply because it was an insurance company, or because the trial court believed the surviving family needed the money more than the insurer.

The Court further addressed arguments by the family that the insurer failed to carry its burden of establishing that settlement funds should be allocated to its lien. In rejecting this argument, the Court held that such evidence was in fact provided. Specifically, the insurer requested the full amount of the total medical expenses incurred beginning with its first petition in intervention, and also provided extensive medical records and testimony to support both the expenses it requested and the damages suffered by the deceased. The Court ultimately remanded the case to the trial court to determine what portion of the settlement funds should be allocated to the insurer.

The Sigmundik case provides even more persuasive authority for insurers to rely on when asserting contractual based rights of subrogation. Based on Fortis Benefits and Sigmundik, it is clear that the Texas Supreme Court will defer to clear policy language when addressing allocation issues between an insured and its insurer. Accordingly, it is imperative that these provisions be reviewed and analyzed at the outset of a claim so that the insurer is not forced to unfairly compromise its rights of subrogation. In addition, Sigmundik also provides a framework for what an insurer needs to do to adequately protect its contractual subrogation interest (namely, intervene and ensure that its damages are properly pled and supported). Adherence to these suggestions will allow an insurer to negotiate from a position of strength should recovery allocation issues arise.
 

Turning an Implied Insured into a Co-insured

Thinking about subrogating against a tenant in Washington? Think again because the Washington Court of Appeals has re-affirmed existing law and increased the risks of such a challenge. 

Since Cascade Trailer v. Beeson was decided 1988, Washington courts have held that tenants are implied co-insureds under a landlord’s property policy. This holding leaves the landlord’s insurer without a remedy when a tenant negligently causes damage. The holding is based on the notion that part of the rent paid by the tenant pays for the landlords property insurance. Because the tenant is a considered an insured, the landlord insurer cannot subrogate.

In an unrelated insurance decision, the Olympic Steamship court determined that an insured who successfully sues an insurer to obtain coverage may recover the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the litigation. Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 117 Wn.2d 37, 811 P.2d 673 (1991). The decision to award attorney’s fees in a coverage dispute is based on equity and flows from the special fiduciary relationship that exists between an insurer and its insured. McGreevy v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., 904 P.2d 731 (1995). 

A recent decision that has yet to be published has intermixed these two unrelated holdings. In Community Association Underwriters of America v. Kalles, et. al., the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed that a tenant is an implied co-insured and further held that, as an insured, the tenant was entitled to an award of attorney fees. In Kalles, the plaintiff insured a condominium complex. One of the units was owned by Elkins who ran a business out of the condominium unit. Elkins sold the business to the Kalles but maintained ownership of the condominium unit, renting the space to the Kalles. The Kalles negligently caused a fire which damaged the condominium building. CAU paid for the damage on behalf of the condominium association and pursued a subrogation claim against the Kalles for negligence.

The lawsuit challenged existing law because this particular scenario was not addressed in Cascade Trailer. In particular, the Kalles was not tenants of the condominium association, rather they were tenants of a unit owner. The Kalles court, however, applied Cascade Trailer and found the Kalles were implied co-insureds under the condominium association’s policy. In a broad expansion of insurance law, the court also awarded the Kalles their attorney’s fees in defending the case against their “insurer,” under Olympic Steamship

The award of Olympic Steamship fees in the situation presented in Kalles is a significant expansion of the attorney’s fees penalty. It certainly raises the stakes when deciding whether to put a case into suit when it is questionable whether the lease language circumvents the implied co-insured rule. 

Utilizing Federal Rule 27--Depositions to Perpetuate Testimony

The sooner evidence can be evaluated and preserved, the better the prospects for a successful outcome. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford to potential plaintiffs and defendants a uniform standard when pre‐action “discovery” can be obtained. Strictly speaking, the relief sought is not discovery, as the rule is utilized to preserve evidence. Federal Rule 27, titled “Depositions to Perpetuate Testimony” permits the preservation of testimony, physical evidence, and documents that are not likely to be available at a later time.

Case law interpreting the rule permits the petitioner to demand production of documents and gain access to physical property for purposes of inspection by a party’s experts. A dying witness or a product or part which is leaving the United States, deteriorating, or changing for any reason, are examples where Rule 27 relief may be invoked. The rule is especially useful where witnesses, such as crew members, are temporarily in the United States, but reside in locations beyond the court’s jurisdiction. In Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione SpA v M/V Allegra, the court allowed depositions, as well as access to documentary and physical evidence in such a circumstance. 

In order to qualify for Rule 27 relief, a lawsuit must be able to be filed in a U.S. court. If the matter cannot be heard in a U.S. court, Rule 27 is not available. Where the matter is to be heard in a foreign tribunal, including overseas arbitrations, and witnesses and/or evidence is within the United States, 28 U.S. § 1782 can be invoked in support of an application to allow for depositions that are to be utilized before foreign or international tribunals. Intel Corp. v Advanced Micro Devices

So before filing a lawsuit to obtain discovery, consider Rule 27 if evidence needs to be preserved and suit can be brought in the United States. Also consider 28 U.S.C.§ 1782 if the proceeding needs to be brought in a foreign tribunal.

Expert Opinions in Wisconsin--What Has Changed?

The Wisconsin legislature enacted a comprehensive tort reform package in early 2011. Part of the legislation changed Wisconsin’s evidence rules governing the admissibility of witness testimony on scientific, technical or specialized subjects. Wisconsin law now aligns with federal standards, which means that Wisconsin practitioners will have to identify any expert opinions they may need in a particular case and ensure that a suitable witness has been selected to render that opinion.

Under the old rules, a witness could offer an expert opinion as long as the judge determined that the witness was an expert in a particular field based on the person’s knowledge, skills, experience, training, or education. The old rule allowed lay witnesses with extensive practical work experience to testify about scientific, technical or specialized subjects. This meant that such a witness did not need degrees or certifications to qualify as an expert witness, and the testimony need only be relevant to be presented to a jury.

The new rules subject the bases for expert opinions to greater scrutiny. In addition to determining whether a witness is qualified to give an opinion on technical matters, a judge must now determine whether the expert’s testimony is based on sound data and methods. This evaluation also entails an assessment of whether the witness’s opinion is based on adequate facts and that the facts were properly used in forming the opinion. Under the new rule, it is important that a witness have the ability to articulate the principles underlying her opinion and the process she went through in forming her opinion.

These new requirements may lead some recovery practitioners to more closely scrutinize a potential witness’s educational background. Most importantly, when an expert opinion is needed, one must now be certain that the expert can state and explain the principles, facts and methods behind the opinion.
 

Subrogating Against The Long Island Power Authority--Guidelines and Pitfalls

In situations where the Long Island electrical distribution system is involved in causing the loss, it is critically important to make sure that you adhere to certain particular Notice of Claim requirements, heed the shortened statute of limitations period, and also identify any additional maintenance vendors as potential targets for recovery.

LIPA

The Long Island Power Authority (“LIPA”) was created by statute under N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§1020 et seq. which states, in part, as follows: “There is hereby created a corporate municipal instrumentality of the state to be known as the ‘Long Island Power Authority,’ which shall be a body corporate and politic and a political subdivision of the state, exercising essential governmental and public powers.”

LIPA owns the retail electric system on Long Island and provides electric service to over 1.1 million customers in Nassau and Suffolk counties, and the Rockaway Peninsula in Queens. LIPA does not own any electric generation assets on Long Island, and it does not provide natural gas service. According to its own press releases, LIPA is the second largest municipal electric utility in the nation in terms of electric revenues, third largest in terms of customers served and the seventh largest in terms of electricity delivered.

Notice of Claim

Any notice of claim must be served upon LIPA within the time limited by and in compliance with all the requirements of section 50-e of the general municipal law. Service of a notice of claim within 90 days after accrual of the claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of any tort action against LIPA. See McShane v Town of Hempstead, 66 AD3d 652 (2d Dept 2009) (citing General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]; § 50-i [1]; Public Authorities Law § 1020-y [3].)

Statute of Limitations

When an action, other than one for wrongful death, founded upon tort is brought against LIPA, the action must be commenced within one year and ninety days after the cause of action accrues. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1020-y.
 

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New Rule for Hearings in Arbitration Forums

Recovery professionals handling claims in Arbitration Forums, Inc.’s Property Arbitration Forum should be aware that, as of March 1, 2012, Arbitration Forums will be implementing new rules for hearings. Rule 3-7 now states that the written Contentions and supporting evidence submitted are all that is to be considered by an arbitrator, and that a party attending the hearing is not allowed to verbally present its case or offer any argument that is not included within the written Contentions. Rule 3-7(a) also provides that a representative who attends a hearing may only clarify, at the arbitrator’s request, his or her party’s Contentions and/or submitted evidence. Consequently, under the new rules, a recovery professional presenting a claim can only answer the questions of the arbitrators and can no longer present arguments.

Rule 3-7 has been also been amended to state that additional evidence can no longer be submitted at the time of the hearing, rather it must be uploaded or submitted to Arbitration Forums by the Materials Due Date.

These new changes to Rule 3-7 go along with the trend in Arbitration Forums of holding “staff hearings,” which are hearings held via a conference call in which the parties are only allowed to answer the questions of the arbitration panel. When preparing your arbitration package, try to anticipate all of the potential written evidence and file materials that you may need to rely upon in presenting your claim. Given these changes, recovery professionals should err on the side of being over inclusive when submitting evidence and supporting documentation.
 

Michigan Expands Contractors' Tort Liability

 A beautiful Michigan home burned down in 2007 due to an improperly ­installed fireplace. The home was re-built in 2007, but a year later, the home burned again. The insurer paid both losses, and asked subrogation counsel to investigate the matter for subrogation potential. The experts concluded that the second house fire was due to the fireplace having been improperly installed during the reconstruction of the home. Suit was brought accordingly. However, the Michigan trial court, contrary to its own views, felt obligated to grant summary judgment to the defendant fireplace installer due to the law in Michigan at the time.  Subrogation counsel filed an appeal.

As we have previously reported, in its June 6, 2011 decision in Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC,______Mich.           NW2d _____(Docket No. 141168), under Michigan's Fultz doctrine, a contractor had no tort liability for injuries or damages to property for work performed in furtherance of its contract unless, by applying a "separate and distinct mode of analysis," a new condition was created as a result of that work, leading to the injury complained of. In practice, proving the creation of such a "separate and distinct" new condition proved to be quite difficult in the context of several court decisions following Fultz. This problem was made worse for potential claimants if the faulty work was performed by someone with whom they were not in privity of contract, such as, in many cases, a subcontractor.the Michigan Supreme Court significantly modified its prior holding in Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assoc., 470 Mich. 460, 683 NW2d 587 (Mich. Sup. Ct., 2004). 

In Loweke, the Michigan Supreme Court stated its intention to "clarify" the holding in Fultz by, in essence, reverting to more traditional tort law. The Court stated that even when one is performing contractual work, that "does not alter the fact that there [exists] a preexisting obligation or duty to avoid harm when one acts….[W]hile the mere existence of a contractual promise does not ordinarily provide the basis of a duty of care to a third party in tort, the existence of a contract [also] does not extinguish duties of care otherwise existing ..." The Loweke Court stated: "Fultz did not extinguish the simple idea that is imbedded deep within the American common law of torts … if one having assumed to act, does so negligently," then liability exists as to a third party for "failure of the defendant to exercise care and skill in the performance itself."

In an unpublished opinion issued on December 22, 2011, relying upon Loweke, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The Court observed that it would ordinarily remand to the trial court to reconsider its summary judgment decision in light of the new Supreme Court authority, but since the trial court had made clear that it felt it was required to reach its conclusion in light of Fultz, the Court of Appeals instead reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment outright and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.  This reversal now provides an opportunity, as well as a legal basis, to seek recovery of damages from the fireplace installer.

Remember the Basics--Make Sure the Insured Knows Whether Subrogation Counsel is Representing Their Interests

 

It is not uncommon for subrogation counsel to file suit in the name of the insured for a variety of reasons. The most obvious is when counsel represents the insured for their uninsured losses or their deductible. However, there are times that for tactical reasons, counsel files suit in the name of the insured to try and avoid the bias that often accompanies an action filed in the name of the carrier. Although the deductible may be accounted for in a suit filed in the name of the insured, if the insured suffered any uninsured losses, they may not be included unless counsel has entered into a retention agreement with the insured. Unless a proper agreement is in place, the carrier and subrogation counsel run the risk of being sued by a disgruntled insured whose uninsured losses were not included in the carrier’s suit. There is a simple solution to avoid such a problem – make it clear to the insured whether or not their claims are included in the lawsuit, especially when suit is filed in the name of the insured. 

 

A perfect example of what can happen when the insured is not advised whether their uninsured losses are included in the carrier’s action occurred in Sandman v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., et al. (Mass. App. No. 10 – P-2080 January 25, 2012). The case stemmed from Quincy Mutual’s subrogation action against a heating oil delivery company that spilled 100 gallons of fuel oil in Elaine Sandman’s property during a delivery. Quincy Mutual covered the remediation costs to clean up the oil spill, which was over $200,000, but denied coverage for damage to Sandman’s personal property due to a policy exclusion. Quincy Mutual then retained subrogation counsel to recover its remediation costs from the oil delivery company. 

 

Approximately two weeks after the spill, as Sandman was looking for an attorney to represent her uninsured losses, Quincy Mutual’s subrogation counsel contacted her and introduced himself as the attorney hired by Quincy Mutual to pursue her claims against the oil delivery company. For the next five years, counsel consistently led Sandman to believe he represented her interests as well as those of Quincy Mutual. Most of those representations were oral, but in one letter counsel sent to Sandman, he referred to her as a client and stated that, “[o]nce we receive the final figure suit will be entered in the Superior Court against parties responsible for damages to your property.” Counsel never informed Sandman that he had not filed suit on her behalf and was only seeking to recover the damages Quincy Mutual paid out on her claim. Sandman assisted counsel in answering interrogatories, and he represented her at her deposition. When the case settled in the spring of 2009, counsel informed Sandman, for the first time, that he was only representing Quincy Mutual. Counsel then told Sandman he could not assist her in pursuing her claims against the oil delivery company because he had a conflict of interest as Quincy Mutual’s attorney. By that time, Sandman’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 

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The Independent Contractor Doctrine is Not Always Applicable in Delivery and Installation Cases

Defendants often claim that the negligent work they are being sued for was done by “an independent contractor”—thus attempting to alleviate their responsibility. This defense is often raised in cases where construction is being performed. However, it can also be raised when one party contracts with another for a specific type of installation or delivery work. In these cases, the independent contractor defense may not be applicable if you can establish that there was no prior disclosure to the owner that independent contractors would be used.

For a variety of reasons, the recovery professional may wish to craft an argument that will allow continued pursuit the primary target for the work done by the independent contractor. While not every jurisdiction has addressed this issue in the context of installations or deliveries, some have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts §429. Under this section of the Restatement, you may be able to diffuse the defense that an independent contractor did the work if you are able to show the general contractor failed to disclose the use of independent contractors or subcontractors.

Massachusetts has adopted Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Harkins v. Colonial Floors, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 127, 1998 WL 22075, * 8, No. CIV A 96 910 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1998), the court set forth a roadmap for how to defeat the defense of the independent contractor doctrine in a repair, installation or delivery setting.

When faced with the independent contractor doctrine in a setting that involves installation or delivery, recovery professionals should examine Section 429 of the Restatement to see whether it may apply in your state.
 

Pennsylvania Rejects Independent Action for Negligent Spoliation

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently joined “the overwhelming majority” of states that have declined to recognize a separate cause of action in tort for negligent spoliation of evidence. In Pyeritz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, __ Pa. __, 32 A.2d 687 (2011), the Court held that “Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence.” The case involved a suit against the Commonwealth for the actions of the Pennsylvania State police. Daniel Pyeritz was found dead at the base of a tree while hunting. He was alone and there were no witnesses. The remains of a black nylon belt were found 15 feet up in a tree stand. The Trooper in charge of the investigation into the death took the two pieces of belt as evidence and logged them into evidence.

The estate retained a lawyer to investigate a civil suit. Counsel wrote to the Trooper and asked if the evidence could be retained for the indefinite future, even after the coroner’s inquest, if able to do so. After the inquest finding an avoidable accidental death, counsel requested that the state police retain the evidence and the Trooper agreed. About 7 months later, the evidence was relocated when the state police barracks was moved. The Trooper in charge had been re-assigned to another post before the evidence was moved. The new Troopers, unaware of the communications between counsel and the original Trooper, authorized the destruction of the evidence. All that remained were some photographs and two envelopes with names of two tree stand belt manufacturers written on them.

The estate filed and then settled for $200,000 an action against the two tree stand belt manufacturers. The estate also filed an action against the Commonwealth in negligence for failure to preserve the evidence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the duty element in negligence required the Court to make a policy judgment whether it is in the public interest to impose damages for failure to conform conduct to a particular standard. The Court held “that as a matter of public policy, this is not a harm against which [a party] should be responsible to protect.” The primary reason relied upon by the Court was that such a cause of action would potentially allow liability where, due to the absence of evidence, it is impossible to determine whether the underlying litigation would have been successful. The Court noted that there were protections already in place to encourage the preservation of evidence and imposing tort liability would involve financial burdens that outweighed the benefit to encourage preservation. The overall public interest favored rejection of a tort based on speculation, the possibility of litigation proliferation, and one whose benefit was already sufficiently protected under existing law.
 

New Discovery Rules in Utah may Streamline Your Subrogation Case

The Utah Supreme Court recently approved a number of amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which limit discovery in civil actions. The amendments became effective for all cases filed after November 1, 2011.

The purpose of the amendments are to allow discovery in proportion to: needs of the case; amount in controversy; complexity of the case; the parties’ resources; the importance of the issues; the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues – U.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(A); the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or expense - R.26(b)(2)(B); the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case – R.26(b)(2)(C); the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative – R.26(b)(2)(D); the information cannot be obtained from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive – R.26(b)(2)(E); and the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the party’s relative access to the information – R.26(b)(2)(F).

The new rules establish 3 tiers of cases based on the damages pled and set limits for standard discovery for each tier:

 

Tier

Amount of Damages

Total Fact Deposition Hours

Rule 33 Interrogatories including all discrete subparts

Rule 34 Requests for Production

Rule 36 Requests for Admission

Days to Complete Standard Fact Discovery

1

$50,000 or less

3

0

5

5

120

2

More than $50,000 and less than $300,000 or non-monetary relief

15

10

10

10

180

3

$300,000 or more

30

20

20

20

210

To obtain discovery beyond these standard limits, the parties may stipulate or a party may file a motion explaining why the extraordinary discovery is necessary. However, the stipulation or motion must be filed before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery. R.26(c).

Finally, the standard discovery and new rules on initial disclosures eliminate the need for case management orders, discovery plans and attorney planning conferences and those requirements have been removed from the rules. R.26(f).

Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures are required to be served within 14 days after the service of the first answer to the complaint. The Defendant must serve its Initial Disclosures within 28 days after Plaintiff’s first disclosures or after Defendant’s appearance in the case, whichever is later.

With respect to experts, within 7 days after the close of fact discovery, Plaintiff must disclose: (i) the expert’s curriculum vitae identifying the expert’s qualifications, publications, and prior testimony; (ii) compensation information; (iii) a brief summary of the opinions the expert will offer; and (iv) a complete copy of the expert’s file for the case.

Within 7 days after this disclosure, the party opposing the retained expert may elect either a deposition or a written report from the expert. A deposition is limited to four hours. The report or deposition must be completed within 28 days after the election is made. Designation of Defendant’s experts follows a similar schedule.

This is a brief summary of the changes to the discovery rules in Utah. From a subrogation perspective, the new rules should streamline discovery and move subrogation cases more quickly toward resolution or trial.

**Many thanks to Leslie Hulburt for her assistance in preparing this blog post.

California's Right to Repair Act: What teeth does it have when its requirements are not followed?

Imagine Mr. and Mrs. Johnson are recent first-time homeowners in California. Last year, they purchased a new home built by Lemon Construction. Shortly after moving into the home, the Johnsons went on a short vacation. To their dismay, they returned the following week to find the entire upstairs of their new house completely flooded.

Investigation revealed that Lemon Construction built the home with a poorly constructed roof, which did not hold up in the first major rainfall of the year. After discovering the flood, the Johnsons immediately hired a friend who was a roof installer to repair and finish their roof. The Johnsons also promptly notified their insurance carrier, which agreed to cover the cost of the roof repair. The Johnsons' insurer also immediately hired a company to restore the second floor of the home. Two months later, when repairs were almost complete, the Johnsons and their insurance carrier decided to file suit against Lemon Construction.

In the above hypothetical, did the Johnsons and/or their insurer create a legal obstacle in the planned action against Lemon Construction?

Unfortunately for the Johnsons, California's "Right to Repair Act" will likely be used as a defense by Lemon Construction because they were not given the opportunity to inspect and offer to repair the home prior to commencing repairs.
 

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BMW Recalls Mini and Mini Cooper Cars

On January 10, 2012, BMW of North America, LLC, announced a voluntary recall of 88,911 Mini and Mini Cooper cars manufactured between 2006-2011 and equipped with 4-cylinder turbocharged engines. The recall arises from overheating of a circuit board which electronically controls an auxiliary water pump that cools the turbocharger in the vehicles. In extreme cases, the overheating of the circuit board can lead to smoldering of the water pump and could result in a vehicle fire. There have been 12 fires reported to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, though none have resulted in accidents or injuries. Per BMW, each of the reported fires occurred while the vehicles were standing still. The recalled models include: 2007-11 Mini Cooper S; 2008-11 Mini Cooper Clubman; 2009-11 Mini Cooper S Convertible; 2009-11 Mini JCW; 2009-11 Mini JCW Clubman; 2009-11 Mini JCW Convertible; 2011 Mini Cooper S Countryman.

Subrogation vs Contribution--Does it Matter?

Practitioners and judges frequently use the terms subrogation and contribution interchangeably. This is legally incorrect and, as one insurance company recently learned, the distinction between the two concepts can be fatal.

In American States Insurance Company v. National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford 2012 DJDAR 197, an insurance carrier attempted to subrogate against another carrier to recover defense and indemnity costs incurred on behalf of the same insureds. The trial court determined that the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations for equitable contribution. The carrier then attempted an "end run" by amending its complaint to assert a cause of action for equitable subrogation. The Court of Appeal held that the sustaining of a demurrer to the amended complaint on the grounds that the underlying case was one for equitable contribution and, therefore, was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal distinguished equitable contribution from equitable subrogation. It held that equitable contribution is the right to recover not from the party primarily liable for the loss, but rather from a co-obligor who shares liability with the party seeking contribution. Conversely, equitable subrogation is a purely derivative cause of action and may only be asserted against the wrongdoer who caused the loss incurred by the insured.

The moral of the story-it is essential to properly identify whether a case is for equitable contribution or equitable subrogation. The statute of limitations differs for the two causes of action and may time-bar an otherwise properly pled claim!
 

EDRs--You Never Know Who's Watching

EDRs or "black boxes" now are contained in a wide range of consumer products including copiers, household appliances, alarm systems and cars. "EDRs" can provide a final data picture of how a product was last operating before a failure happened. Technological advances include building EDRs with a read write tamper proof cabability. For example, an unexpected rise in temperature or surge in power can trigger an EDR that may support an eye witness observation that a product was on fire, smoking or operating erratically. Critics condemn EDRs suggesting they are surveillance monitors akin to those used by "Big Brother" in George Orwell's novel "1984." The reality is far different. EDRs objectively record data within state prescribed privacy legislative requirements.

Smart Technology

Smart Technology refers to systems that monitor and diagnose appliances while in use to include home energy and security systems. Those systems can control heating and air conditioning systems to increase safety while saving energy. These systems can take measurements at pre-determined intervals by use of meters and controls.

Major companies such as Panasonic, General Electric and LG offer Smart Technology systems. LG offers appliances with THINQ Technology that meters and controls "smart" refrigerators, dishwashers, stoves, ovens, etc. LG offers a smart diagnosis program that claims to notice when a home appliance does not operate properly and issues alerts. That system will soon become WI-FI capable. Panasonic has a product line called ECONAVI, that covers 30 household appliances and will monitor usage and a user's living environment. GE offers a similar program called Nucleus Energy Manager that collects real time information on a product's usage.

Conclusion

Subrogation professionals should encourage their consultants to actively seek out and recover EDR information when available. That data may provide a wealth of information about the operating parameters of a product believed to have been involved in a failure. That data can then be evaluated and assessed as part of the overall subrogation investigation.